Kazakhstan Supplies 46% of the World's Uranium. China and Russia Are Fighting for It.

Kazakhstan produced 21,227 tonnes of uranium in 2025, nearly half the world's supply, making it the linchpin of the global nuclear fuel chain. But as Western nations race to secure energy independence and build new reactors, China and Russia have spent the past decade quietly buying up mining rights, processing facilities, and transport corridors across Central Asia—leaving the United States and European Union scrambling for access to a resource they once took for granted.

For Murat Ospanov, a 52-year-old geologist who has worked at the Tortkuduk mine in southern Kazakhstan since 1998, the shift has been impossible to miss. "Ten years ago, our biggest clients were French and Japanese," he said in an interview at his office in Shymkent in March 2026. "Now it's all China Nuclear Corporation and Rosatom. They don't just buy the ore—they own the wells, the processing plants, even the railway cars that ship it out."

The quiet consolidation of uranium supply chains has become one of the most consequential—and least visible—geopolitical contests of the 2020s. While headlines focus on lithium for batteries and rare earths for semiconductors, uranium remains essential for the 440 nuclear reactors operating worldwide and the 60 under construction. Without it, net-zero pledges collapse. And without Kazakhstan, there is no alternative supply at scale.

The Chinese Playbook

China's state-owned nuclear firms began acquiring stakes in Kazakh uranium mines in 2006, but the strategy accelerated dramatically after 2017. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) now hold equity in at least 14 major uranium projects across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, including direct ownership of the Semizbay and Zhalpak mines and joint ventures with state-owned Kazatomprom.

In November 2023, CNNC signed a 20-year offtake agreement with Kazatomprom guaranteeing Beijing 8,000 tonnes of uranium annually—nearly 40% of Kazakhstan's output. The deal included construction of a $1.2 billion uranium conversion facility in Aktau on the Caspian coast, giving China control over enrichment feedstock production for the first time outside its borders.

The move alarmed Western nuclear utilities. France's Orano, formerly Areva, had operated in Kazakhstan since 1996 but was outbid on three consecutive license renewals between 2021 and 2024. Cameco, the Canadian uranium giant, saw its stake in the Inkai mine diluted when Kazatomprom sold a 20% share to CGN in August 2024 without consulting its Western partner.

China is currently building 21 new nuclear reactors and has announced plans for 150 more by 2035. Its domestic uranium reserves can supply only 15% of projected demand, making Central Asian imports indispensable. But the acquisition strategy extends far beyond self-sufficiency. By 2025, Chinese firms controlled an estimated 18% of global uranium mining capacity outside China—enough to influence prices and allocations worldwide.

Russia's Stranglehold on Processing

While China has focused on mining, Russia controls the next stage: uranium enrichment. Rosatom's TENEX subsidiary enriches approximately 44% of the uranium used in the world's nuclear reactors, according to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even uranium mined in Kazakhstan and sold to Western utilities typically transits through Russian enrichment facilities in Angarsk, Novouralsk, Zelenogorsk, or Seversk.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union imposed sanctions on Russian oil, gas, and coal. But it explicitly exempted uranium and enrichment services. France, which depends on nuclear power for 63% of its electricity, argued that alternative enrichment capacity did not exist. The United States, which gets 24% of its reactor fuel from Russia, agreed.

In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Energy awarded $2.7 billion to restart enrichment at the Piketon facility in Ohio, closed since 2001. But according to the DOE's own timeline, the plant will not reach commercial capacity until 2029 at the earliest. Orano's Georges Besse II facility in France can theoretically fill some of the gap, but it is already operating near maximum output and cannot absorb the full volume of European demand.

Rosatom has also deepened its grip on Central Asian uranium at the source. In March 2024, it signed a 15-year agreement with Uzbekistan's state uranium company, Navoi Mining, to develop the Uchkuduk deposit and build a new enrichment line at the Angarsk complex specifically for Uzbek fuel. The deal gives Russia processing rights to 3,000 tonnes annually—nearly all of Uzbekistan's production.

Astana's Balancing Act

Kazakhstan has tried to position itself as a neutral supplier, selling to all bidders. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has repeatedly pledged that Kazatomprom will honor contracts with Western, Chinese, and Russian clients alike. But the mathematics of leverage work against Astana. China and Russia together account for 68% of Kazakhstan's uranium exports by volume, according to customs data analyzed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Geographically, Kazakhstan is landlocked and surrounded by Russia, China, and states under their influence. The only export routes for uranium are rail lines that run through Russia to Europe or through China to Asian ports. When protests erupted in Almaty in January 2022, Russian troops arrived within 48 hours under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. The message was clear: Moscow still considers Central Asia within its sphere.

In February 2026, Tokayev announced that Kazakhstan would increase uranium production to 25,000 tonnes annually by 2028, a 19% rise from current levels. But he conspicuously declined to say where the additional output would go. Western diplomats in Astana said privately they expect the bulk to flow to China under the 2023 CNNC agreement.

The American Deficit

The United States once dominated global uranium supply. In 1980, U.S. mines produced 16,810 tonnes, more than any other country. But by 2025, domestic production had collapsed to just 173 tonnes—less than 1% of global output—according to the U.S. Geological Survey. American utilities now import 95% of their reactor fuel, much of it from Kazakhstan via Russian intermediaries.

Congress has recognised the vulnerability. The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, signed in May 2024, bans imports of Russian enriched uranium starting in 2028, with temporary waivers allowed until 2040 if no alternative exists. But the law provides no mechanism to secure non-Russian supply. Meanwhile, China and Russia have locked in contracts extending to 2043.

In March 2026, a U.S. trade delegation visited Astana seeking to negotiate a government-to-government uranium supply agreement. Kazakh officials asked for $4 billion in financing to build a new conversion facility and expand rail capacity to bypass Russian territory. The Americans offered $150 million in Export-Import Bank credits. Talks collapsed within three days.

Beyond Uranium: The Rare Earths Race

While uranium dominates the nuclear calculus, a parallel struggle is underway for rare earth elements essential to wind turbines, defense systems, and electric vehicles. Kazakhstan holds an estimated 1.5 million tonnes of rare earth reserves, the world's ninth-largest deposit, concentrated in the Aktyuz and Kara-Oba regions.

In September 2025, China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group signed a joint venture with Kazakhstan's national geological company to develop the Kara-Oba deposit at a cost of $890 million. The agreement gives Beijing processing rights to the entire output—projected at 6,000 tonnes annually by 2029. For comparison, the United States produced zero tonnes of separated rare earths in 2025, relying entirely on imports, predominantly from China.

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have followed similar trajectories. In Kyrgyzstan, Chinese companies operate 11 of the country's 14 active gold and rare earth mines. In Uzbekistan, China is financing a $3.2 billion uranium and rare earth processing complex near Navoi, scheduled to open in 2027. Russia, focused on enrichment and logistics, has not contested China's dominance in extraction—an implicit division of labor that Western officials describe as a "resource carve-up."

What Comes Next

The International Energy Agency projects that global nuclear capacity will need to double by 2050 to meet net-zero targets. That requires an additional 30,000 tonnes of uranium annually—more than the entire current output of Kazakhstan. New mines take 10 to 15 years to develop. Enrichment facilities take longer. The supply crunch is already baked in.

Some Western governments are belatedly trying to rebuild domestic capacity. In January 2026, the European Commission proposed a €5 billion "Critical Minerals Alliance" to finance new uranium mines in France, Sweden, and the Czech Republic. Australia announced it would reopen the Ranger mine in Kakadu, closed since 2021. But none of these projects will produce significant volumes before 2032.

For now, the advantage lies with Beijing and Moscow. China has secured contracts for 40% of Kazakhstan's uranium through 2043 and controls processing for most of Central Asia's rare earths. Russia enriches nearly half the world's reactor fuel and has veto power over export routes. The West, having spent two decades outsourcing its nuclear supply chain, is now discovering what dependency means.

Back in Shymkent, Murat Ospanov is pragmatic about the future. "The uranium is here, under our feet," he said. "But the money, the technology, the transport—that all comes from outside. Whoever controls those things controls the resource. Right now, that's not Europe or America."