Russia Mines Sudan's Gold While 7.1 Million Flee Starvation

The road from Port Sudan to the Red Sea Hills runs through thirty-two checkpoints. At fourteen of them, the men who search vehicles wear no insignia. They speak Russian to each other and Arabic to the drivers. They are looking for anyone who might photograph the mining operations that begin eight kilometres past the last checkpoint, where Meroe Gold Company operates an open-pit mine that did not exist three years ago.

This correspondent reached the perimeter in February 2026. A Sudanese officer said the mine was closed to visitors. A Russian man in civilian clothes said the area was a military zone. Neither explanation is technically true. The mine is operated by a private company registered in the Central African Republic. But the company is controlled by Kharkov Group, the renamed and restructured entity that absorbed Wagner Group's African operations after Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in August 2023.

The mine produces forty tonnes of gold per year. At April 2026 prices, that is $2.8 billion in gross value. The Sudanese Armed Forces receive a royalty the government will not disclose. They receive something else that matters more: weapons, ammunition, and the political protection that comes from hosting a Russian strategic asset while fighting a civil war against the Rapid Support Forces that has killed an estimated 61,000 people and displaced 7.1 million since April 2023.

What France Left Behind

The pattern is now visible across the Sahel. France withdrew its last troops from Niger in December 2023, from Mali in August 2022, and was expelled from Burkina Faso in February 2023 after military coups in all three countries. Operation Barkhane, which deployed 5,100 French troops across the region to fight jihadist insurgencies, ended after a decade with no decisive victories and deepening resentment among populations who saw foreign bases but not security.

Into that vacuum came Wagner, and after Prigozhin's death, Africa Corps—the restructured entity under direct Russian Ministry of Defence control. The model is consistent: Russia provides military training, mercenary forces, and weapons in exchange for mining concessions, diplomatic alignment, and the expulsion of Western influence. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formalized their break with France and ECOWAS by creating the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023. All three juntas have invited Russian forces. All three have granted mining concessions.

In Mali, Russian forces now operate from the former French base at Gao. Kharkov Group holds gold mining rights in Kayes and Sikasso regions. Production figures are state secrets, but satellite imagery analysed by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime shows active operations at twelve sites that were dormant or small-scale under Malian state control. A Malian opposition figure in exile in Senegal—who requested anonymity for fear of assassination—told this correspondent in March that Russian extraction in Mali likely exceeds thirty tonnes annually.

In the Central African Republic, Russia's presence predates the Sahel expansion. Wagner forces arrived in 2018 at the invitation of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. Lobaye Mining Company and other Russian-controlled entities now hold concessions across a territory roughly the size of South Korea. The CAR government receives royalties it will not disclose and weapons that allowed Touadéra to survive a rebel offensive in 2021.

The Junta Bargain

What the juntas receive is survival. Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in Mali in May 2021. Captain Ibrahim Traoré took control of Burkina Faso in September 2022. General Abdourahamane Tchiani overthrew Niger's elected president Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023. All three face domestic insurgencies, international isolation, and populations impoverished by conflict and climate collapse.

ECOWAS imposed sanctions after each coup. Those sanctions failed. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2024 and created the Alliance of Sahel States as a counterweight. The AES alliance declared mutual defense commitments, coordinated security operations, and aligned foreign policy around a single principle: the former colonial power and its regional proxies are the enemy.

Russia provides military equipment the West will not sell to coup governments. It provides mercenaries who do not lecture about human rights or democratic transitions. It provides diplomatic cover at the United Nations, where Russia has used its Security Council veto to shield its African partners from international accountability. And it provides an economic model the juntas understand: extraction for protection, with no conditions about governance or civil liberties.

Sudan's Civil War, Russia's Opportunity

Sudan represents the fullest realization of the model. The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo has killed at least 61,000 people according to estimates by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports 7.1 million internally displaced persons and 1.8 million refugees in neighbouring countries. Famine conditions exist in Darfur and Kordofan. Eighteen of Sudan's medical schools have closed. Khartoum, a city of six million, has running water three days per week.

Russia backs al-Burhan's SAF. The United Arab Emirates backs the RSF. Both sides receive weapons and neither side is winning. The war is now in its third year. The humanitarian catastrophe grows while the gold flows out.

Russia's interest in Sudan predates the civil war. Prigozhin visited Khartoum in 2018, six months before the uprising that toppled Omar al-Bashir. Wagner forces provided training to Sudanese security services. In 2019, leaked documents showed Russian entities negotiating for a naval base at Port Sudan and mining concessions in exchange for political support. The 2019 revolution interrupted those negotiations. The 2023 civil war resumed them.

Meroe Gold Company is the flagship. Kharkov Group also operates smaller sites near Ariab and Gabeit. Sudan's Ministry of Minerals has granted exploration licenses covering 34,000 square kilometres in Red Sea and River Nile states—an area larger than Belgium. The licenses were issued between October 2023 and February 2025, while the civil war raged and international attention focused elsewhere.

What the Institutions Say

The United Nations knows. A February 2024 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan documented Russian mining operations and arms transfers in violation of the UN arms embargo imposed in 2004. The Security Council took no action. Russia is a permanent member with veto power.

The African Union knows. Its Peace and Security Council issued a statement in June 2024 expressing concern about foreign interference in Sudan. It did not name Russia. It took no enforcement action. The AU has no mechanism to stop member states from signing mining contracts.

ECOWAS knows. Its sanctions on Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger were designed to pressure the juntas toward civilian rule. The juntas withdrew from ECOWAS instead. The organization lost one-third of its membership and all credibility as a guarantor of democratic governance. In March 2026, ECOWAS quietly lifted most sanctions in an effort to maintain dialogue. The juntas did not rejoin.

The European Union knows. Its diplomats privately describe Russian mining operations as resource plunder. Publicly, the EU offers development aid and calls for dialogue. It has no leverage. France, the former colonial power and EU's primary actor in the region, is now persona non grata in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and increasingly across Francophone Africa.

The Price on the Ground

The villages near Sudan's Red Sea mines are emptying. Residents report forced relocations, water sources diverted to mining operations, and grazing lands fenced off. A farmer who gave only his first name, Hassan, told this correspondent in February that his family had farmed the same land for four generations. In November 2024, men arrived with a document stamped by the Ministry of Minerals. The family had thirty days to leave. They received no compensation. They now live in a camp outside Port Sudan with 14,000 other displaced people.

In Mali, human rights groups document extrajudicial killings by Russian mercenaries operating alongside Malian forces. In March 2022, witnesses in Moura described a massacre of at least 300 civilians during a joint operation. Human Rights Watch investigated and confirmed the accounts. The Malian government denied the massacre occurred. Russia said its forces were not present. Satellite imagery and witness testimony contradicted both claims.

The insurgencies have not been defeated. In Mali, jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and Islamic State control more territory in 2026 than they did when France withdrew in 2022. In Burkina Faso, half the country is ungoverned. Attacks on civilians increased 68 percent between 2023 and 2025, according to ACLED data. Russian mercenaries provide protection for juntas and mining sites. They do not provide security for civilians.

What Is Not Being Done

No international court has jurisdiction over Russian private military companies operating in Africa. The International Criminal Court has no case. Wagner Group and its successors operate through shell companies registered in jurisdictions that do not cooperate with international investigations. Russia does not extradite its citizens. The juntas that host these forces are the same governments that would need to authorize investigations.

No sanctions regime has proven effective. The United States designated Wagner Group and imposed sanctions in 2022. Those sanctions apply to entities formally named Wagner. They do not apply to Kharkov Group, Africa Corps, or the dozens of mining companies registered in the CAR, Sudan, and Mali through which Russian extraction operates. The EU imposed similar sanctions with similar gaps.

No transparency mechanism exists. Gold refined in Russia or UAE cannot be traced to its origin. International buyers know this. Swiss refineries processed $2.4 billion worth of Russian-origin gold in 2025, according to Swiss customs data. Switzerland declined to join EU and US sanctions on Russian gold imports. The UAE became the largest destination for Sudanese gold exports in 2024. Neither country requires disclosure of mine origin.

The juntas are consolidating, not liberalizing. Mali's Colonel Goïta postponed elections indefinitely in April 2024. Burkina Faso's Captain Traoré extended military rule by another five years in February 2025. Niger's General Tchiani announced a transition timeline of 2028, then 2030, now unspecified. All three have arrested opposition figures, closed independent media, and expelled international observers. Russia supports this consolidation. It is the point.

What Happens Next

The model will spread. Russia now has a proven template: identify a weak or coup-vulnerable state, offer military support without governance conditions, secure mining concessions, extract resources at scale, and provide enough weapons to keep the junta in power but not enough to win its wars. The civilian population pays the cost. The international community watches.

Other states are watching too. Zimbabwe's government has reportedly approached Russia about mining partnerships. The Democratic Republic of Congo, rich in cobalt and coltan, hosts a Russian trade mission exploring joint ventures. Madagascar, Guinea, and Chad have all received visits from Russian delegations in the past eighteen months.

Sudan's civil war will continue. Neither the SAF nor the RSF can win militarily, but both can continue fighting as long as external patrons provide weapons. Russia arms al-Burhan. The UAE arms Dagalo. The war funds itself through gold plundered from territories each side controls. The International Crisis Group estimates the war could continue another five years at current intensity. The famine will worsen. More people will flee. The mines will keep operating.

By the time you read this, another convoy will have left the Red Sea Hills headed for Port Sudan. The trucks carry gold concentrate worth approximately $190 million per shipment, based on transport frequency observed by maritime tracking services. A portion will be recorded as royalty to Sudan's government. The rest will vanish into the networks of shell companies that have replaced Wagner's formal structure. The gold will be refined, sold, and incorporated into electronics, jewelry, and financial instruments around the world. There is no stamp that says it was mined by men without insignia from a country that is starving.

Hassan, the displaced farmer, asked this correspondent a question in February: "Does anyone outside Sudan know what is happening here?" The answer is yes. The institutions know. The governments know. They know and they are doing nothing.